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1. The concept of secret 
The ordinary use of "secret" is so diverse that it covers 
a vast field of meaning; to narrow it flown we can turn to the 
dictionary and take its various definitions as it starting 
point. Naturally, we then neglect some particular occurences 
of the words as a lexical item, though at the same time we 
presume that they could be classified under the following two 
definitions. 
The Oxford English Dictionary gives seven separata defini-
tions of the word "secret" as a substantive; among them two 
are very specialized (2. a prayer in liturgical use, 7. a coat 
of mail), two others do no more than specify things that can 
serve as the object of secret (4. a method, 5. a place), one 
lists only several phrases with the? word "secret", while the 
remaining two unfold the basic meanings of "secret" at once 
interrelated and contrasting:* "1. Something unknown or unreveal 
or that is. known only by initiation or revelation, a mystery 
chiefly pi., the hidden affairs or workings (of God, Nature, 
Science)" and "3. Some fact, affair, design, action, etc. the 
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knowledge of which is kept to oneself or shared only with 
those whom it concerns or to whom it has been confided, 
something that cannot be divulged without violation of command 
2 
or breach of confidence." 
According to the first definition the secret should 
correspond to an object beyond the bounds of knowledge. Then 
it is viewed as something existing like a real object, while 
the word "secret" expresses a negative epistemologlcal attitude. 
For in this sense we deal with the secret as an epistemological 
phenomenon the cause of which has yet to be discovered. Now 
the secret is not a linguistic but rather a scientific problem, 
though language cannot be wholly excluded for all our understan-
ding is closely related to speaking: there is no problem until 
we consider secret a thing that is totally unknown, but as soon 3 
as we obtain the minimal information on it and we name it al-
though we known nothing of its cause except its being, i.e. it 
exists, the over-discussed problem of analyticity arises, and 
the epistemological problem becomes a linguistic one too. For, 
as Searls pointed out, "the argument of defining the criterion 4 
of 'analytic' is self-defeating"; in other words, how can we 
name a thing without knowing the very essence of its existence 
(that is the criterion of applying the term to new cases) . Still 
the solution remains scientific: it is more relevant informa-
tion from empirical sources that we have to have for naming. 
So we cannot know a thing unless we possess the necessary 
information as to its cause, for knowing that it exists generally 
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is not enough. 
According to the third definition the secret should 
correspond to a way of communication; it describes a situation 
in which contact between potential addressers and addressees 
is prohibited. To this we may add some other cases when the 
break-down of contact is not intentional: the addresser and 
the addressee cannot get into touch because of reasons of 
time-and-space, or there is a physical contact but somehow 
they do not seem to speak the "same" language and so they * 
cannot understand each other. In this sense we deal with the 
secret as a linguistic phenomenon but we will inevitably intrude 
into the field of pragmatics as well.^ 
To sum up so far, we have two clear-cut definitions of 
"secret": 
a./ the first refers to an epistemological attitude, to a 
relation between things and human consciousness. Here we would 
like to put emphasis on the latter because we hold strongly 
the view that the secret can never be an attribute of things 
or a label attached to them by the human mind or a thing-in-
-itself; neither can it be a type of behaviour sanctioned by 
conventions. Briefly, it is not an entity but a system of rela-
tions. 
b./ the second definition refers to a type of communication: 
in this approach, it is less tempting to think of secret in 
terms of an ontological entity than to consider it as a 
communicative situation. For it is not the knowledge but the 
divulgation of it that matters; not the information in itself 
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but the fact that it is kept from others. So this type of 
communication will be describable in terms of those who keep 
the information to themselves .and .of those from whom it is 
kept; i.e. in terms of potential addressers and addressees. 
We aim at giving a general and unified description of sec-
ret based on the two definitions above. But then we encounter 
a very serious problem: What will the relation between the 
radically different definitions be: is it possible to for-
• 
mulate one without referring to the other? If yes, then they 
cannot be used as parts of a more general theory because we 
shall have to speak of two basically different concepts of 
"secret"; if no, then our argument will surely turn out, at 
cne point or other, to be self-defeating, though we have seen 
that this failure is due rather to analyticity than to a more 
particular theory of secret. In other words, we have to 
consider the relation of epistemology and communication. 
The situation is parallel with the problem of linguistic 
meaning and utterer's intention. In "Meaning and Truth" 
Strawson^ argues for the interrelatedness of a semantic and 
a communicational theory of language; if the utterer produces 
his utterance with a complex audience-directed-intention, 
involving the audience's thinking that he has a certain 
belief, there is no detached element corresponding to this 
expressing a belief with no such intention. But this does 
not mean that an Audience-Directed-Belief-Expression (ADBE) 
is a kind of logical compound of two simpler concepts of AD 
and BE and hence that BE is conceptually independent of ADBE. 
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What we can do is produce a description of a belief expres-
sion and imagine a case for it, although this description will 
depend on the description of the case in which the utterer has 
an audiance-directed-intention. This argument closely parallels 
our own in the following way: we can avoid the problem of the 
interrelatedness of our two definitions in two ways; either 
we exclude the first one from our analysis on the basis of a 
very strong argument; it lacks a criterion used in ordinary 
life when somebody considers something secret, i.e. there 
should be an intention not to reveal the secret to others; or 
we use the word "communication" in a wider sense: we consider 
every activity of an individual in getting new information on 
a certain thing as a type of communication - permitting that in 
some cases the addresser remains unknown or is not a definite 
person but a thing, Nature, Fate, Social Institute, etc. Then 
we may preserve our first definition as the description of 
certain conditions to be fulfilled for a successful communica-
tion of the secret. We choose the latter solution. Now the 
relevance of Strawson's argument should be clear: the defini-
tion referring to an epistemological attitude will correspond 
to a Belief-Expression and will then give the semantic descrip-
tion of "secret", what its meaning is, the definition referring 
to a type of communication will correspond to an Audience-
-Directed-Intention and will then give account of the pragmatics 
of "secret", what its use is like. And the two definitions 
together will serve as a framework for a theory of "secret" 
determining a certain speech-act which - as we will argue 
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later - parallels the pragmatics of referring and needs the 
incorporation of some game-theoretical elements. In this 
approach we can avoid entering the field of ontology, and 
even the problem of the relation of epistemology and communica-
tion seems to evaporate: knowledge (and belief respectively) 
and communication (of this knowledge and belief) cannot be 
separated; knowledge cannot be conceptually independent of 
communication in general, i.e. our activity of knowing and our 
activity of communicating seem to run on parallel lines. 
However, they are not logically interrelated: there is no logical 
necessity between an epistemological attitude which turns on 
knowing (believing) a certain thing and the communicating of 
this thing as a secret. Rather we would say; the communication 
of a thing intended as a secret conversationally presupposes a 
certain epistemological attitude with respect to that thing. Or 
conversely, for every epistemological attitude with respect to 
a certain thing can be found a case in which it is associated 
with some intention to communicate that thing as a secret. Or 
more generally, the secret is a system of certain rules and 
conditions that orientates our activity to acquire knowledge. 
In the forthcoming analysis we argue that there is a 
common term for many of the debated categories of modal logic: 
quantification, referentially transparent vs referentially 
opaque, "de re" vs "de dicto", possible worlds, etc. So in 
explicating what this term means we can account for all these 
problems and on the very same basis: if they can be reduced 
to some well-known thing in ordinary life and if this then can 
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be described as specifying'certain relations logically, they 
all are given a unified and general explanation. It is for 
these aims that we recur to the word "secret". In conducting 
a conceptual analysis of it, instead of speaking of the inter-
relations of concepts, we make use of the interrelations of 
concrete individuals, i.e. when we define "secret" as "some-
thing kept unknown from someone by somebody", we say something 
like: there is a proposition p and there are at least two 
individúale x and y such that x=a and y-b, and a knows that p 
while b does not know that p, and a intends that b does not 
know that p.' Though this scheme will be amended later, it 
seems clear that we are in favour of a quantified modal logic. 
But the validity of this option can only be made apparent from 
a pragmatic point of view. 
A further comment should be made about the use of some 
terms of our analysis; we start with giving a framework for a 
general description of "secret" and we define two components 
of this conceptual framework, the semantics, which determine 
certain conditions and which can be specified within a simple 
modal logical system, and the pragmatics, which comprises certain 
rules for corresponding communicative acts when our defined 
semantic ideal becomes applied, and which even explains some 
reasonable cases of the logic of action. Throughout this ana-
lysis we use the terms epistemology and communication somewhat 
interchangeably; this does not mean that we hold them to be 
identical, but otherwise we cannot give a pragmatic account for 
some crucial semantic problems. Another minor justification 
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may be that we take over the instrumental idea of modal lo-
g 
gic, which, in turn, will have no sense unless its relation 
to a possible pragmatics is clarified; in accordance with this, 
we assume the point of view not of a single individual but of 
a whole community for we are concerned not with the ontology 
of notions but with their epistemic applicability, which, 
within a community, strongly involves communication. So it is 
very difficult to doubt the interdependence of these two 
concepts though surely there is no logical tie between them: 
the first can be specified within a possible semantic system 
of modal logic while the second can be delineated in virtue of 
certain governing rules conceived within a corresponding 
pragmatic system. But there is no necessity for the actual 
interplay of the two. So to explicate what the concept of 
"secret" stands for we have to state what the relation of 
epistemology and communication is like, i.e. the relation of 
certain conditions and rules. The rules should give us the 
intended type of communication while the conditions are prag-
matically presupposed in the rules of communication and hence 9 
making possible certain conversational implicatures and so 
not being conceptually independent of the total speech-act 
of secret. This may serve as a framework of a general descrip-
tion of the two different definitions. 
2. Secret as a system of epistemological conditions 
In this part we concern ourselves with epistemic logic in 
that we try to set down some semantic conditions of the function 
of secret. Though it has been thoroughly dealt with by many 
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logicians the basic ideas may still seem, if not at once 
paradoxial, at least questionable. All that we feel is that 
it is needed to explicate some concepts which are used in or-
dinary language. In trying to do this we will inevitably 
construct a system, a "normative ideal"'''® which being applied 
in certain cases will show some discrepancies; but these discre-
pancies will not invalidate our original system for it is not 
important whether everything in our theory corresponds to so-
mething in our empirical subject matter or vice versa (there 
is no empirical reality that could be fully and unquestionably 
conceptualized). It is enough for us that "in providing a for-
mal analysis of a cluster of concepts by developing a semantics 
and truth conditions for sentences expressing propositions 
about those concepts, we are interested primarily in the kinds 
of relations which may obtain among the entities which comprise 
our subject matter. For it is in terms of these relations that 
we construct the truth and denotation definitions for our for-
mal language and it is in virtue of these relations that the 
axioms of our theory will turn out to be logically true."'''1' 
So we aim at clarifying some logical relations that obtain 
between certain potential relata of our theory, and it is how 
such we can comprise in our theory without violating certain 
laws of consistency, compactness, well-formedness, etc. that 
will decide whether epistemic logic is worth the having. 
As we have seen that the modal conditions are strongly re-
lated to the operating rules of communication we have to make 
some general statements about the social relevance of the 
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problem. This also follows from the fact that modality should 
not be seen from the point of view of a single individual but 
of a whole community. We do not exclude cases when it is an indi-
vidual who seeks to know a certain thing but we have to concede 
that anyone of the community to which the given individual 
belongs may join him in the search, in this case secret can 
only function in a community. This community need not correspond 
to society; we consider a community every association of people 
with a certain purpose and so with a definite system of norms 
that helps any member of the community in deciding the truth-
-value of a piece of information in the event that the corres-
ponding verification of it might be hindered somehow. According 
to the specific system of norms involving e.g. initiation, 
structure of power, etc. different types of community can be 
established: religious, political, social, ethical, etc. The 
force of their normative systems may vary on a wide range; they 
can even cut off the members from any external sources completely 
debarring re-valuation. But this fact does not have any bearing 
on the analysis of secret; as the modal conditions relative to 
epistemological attitudes of certain members of the community 
are dependent on the rules of communication what will concern 
us is the fact of communicating certain beliefs to be specified 
later as different kinds of semantical strategies - and not a 
set of propositions either true or false; i.e. we let alone 
the problem of truth and falsity and consider some performative 
character of "secret". Then the clarification of the corres-
ponding system of norms can only aim at stating what may be 
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reasonably expected to be believed to be true, i.e. at descri-
bing a set of conventions relative to the content of beliefs 
while leaving intact the logical structure of the communica-
tion of secret. Then the epistemological conditions - to be 
called from now on "modal contexts" - will take over the place 
of simple propositions to be either true or false - which have 
nothing to do with the concept of "secret", though the defini-
tion of the above conditions will be made with respect to the 
same proposition. 
Now we turn to the construction of the modal contexts. First 
we introduce some logical terms: instead of information we 
speak about propositions, but we consider only such cases when 
they can be reformulated as fix) where x is a variable into 
which proper names can be substituted. To indicate the possi-
bility of substitution we write d/x where d is an individual 
constant. Now, let the form f(x) correspond to minimal infor-
mation that states the existence of a certain object while 
fid) corresponds to the maximal information that states the 
cause of its existence. Then if p is an arbitrary propositi-
on, p {d/x) does not say more than fix), i.e. p contains a free 
variable; while fid) will be indentical with the stronger 
formula p ld=x), which will certainly imply the former but not 
conversely. Then, on the basis of what has been said we can 
construct the modal contexts in the following way: in de-
scribing the propositional attitudes of the members of the 
community let us use the verb "to know"; there are many things 
that may.prompt this use; first of all it entitles us to gene-
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ralize existentially in the modal contexts in a certain unprob-
lematic way, whereas with other epistemic verbs it might seem 
inappropriate; secondly, in communication what are pragmatically 
or conversationally presupposed on the part of the speaker are 
- according to the maxims of Grice - certain beliefs which are' 
to be taken adequately grounded to be true by the audience; 
thirdly, it is the communication of certain beliefs, presump-
tions, knowledge, etc. that interests us and not what kind of 
12 
beliefs, presumptions, knowledge, etc. can be communicated. 
So, we indicate with the capital letter K the verb "to know" 
and with the small latin letters a, b, a - figuring in the 
indices of K - the persons whose propositional attitude are 
being described. Now, if p = fix) is an arbitrary proposition, 
it can function as secret within a certain community, if and 
only if there can be defined three different modal contexts 
all of which will have p in their scope and which can be 
described as follows: . 
(i) let a stand for those and only for those individuals 
who know about a certain thing as secret in a given community 
but they do not know the solution to it; then they know /(x) 
but they do not know /(d); e.g. they know that x robbed the 
bank but they do not know that x is none other than the Great 
Ben; 
(ii) let b stand for those and only for those individuals who 
know about a thing as secret in a given community and who also 
know the solution to it; then they know f(d), too; e.g. if 
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p = ".%• killed the president" and x is the Great Ben, then b 
is entitled to make the following statement: "I know who killed 
the president" - only if he happens to know that the Great Ben 
was the murderer; 
(iii) finally let a stand for those and only for those indivi-
duals who do not know about a thing as secret in a given communi-
ty; then they do not know even f(x), e.g. they do not even know 
that somebody killed the president. 
In terms of a, b and a all the members of the community 
can be defined. Then, what we have said informally can be 
formulized in the following way: 
(1) (3a) Ox) [Kap(d/x) and - Kffp (d=x)] 
(2) (3b) Ox) [Xbp(d/x) and ¡<bp(d=x)) 
(3) (3c) Ox) ~ Kap (d/x) 
This can be seen as the result of a first general approach 
of the meaning of "secret". It is based on some theses of 
"Knowledge and Belief" and some other works by Hintikka where 
he makes a restriction on quantification in modal contexts 
using the surplus condition "y knows what a is" formulated as 
"y knows that x = a". The validity of this restriction on 
quantification has been questioned by others."'"3 To reject 
counter-arguments we can refer to McLane's paper emphasizing 
that this is to be considered as a "normative ideal", though 
a stronger reason for rejecting them is to be found - as we 
will see - in a pragmatic reconsideration of the same problem. 
What is important at this point in our analysis is whether the 
formulas of (1) and (2) are adequate to reflect the basic 
0 
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semantical problem for which the concept of "secret" was 
introduced. This results clearly from Hintikka's argument on 
analyticity and on model sets. It says that as soon as we 
speak about model sets a free singular term to be substituted 
into a variable bound by a quantifier will not pick out a 
particular individual and so the corresponding picture to be 
constructed on the basis of the prescriptions the given model 
set contains is never a unique one: there is always a multip-
licity of correlations, i.e. it represents reality in more than 
one way; and this is what our modal context (1) should mean. 
While the other context (2) should indicate an end-point in 
the corresponding picture construction with its stronger 
restriction (d=x), though this is a very limited process. 
Suffice now to say that the possibility of arriving at such 
an endpoint can never be defined semantically but only within 
a pragmatic framework."'"5. So this should be the real difference 
between (1) and (2): in the first case we contemplate a clear 
semantical aspect of the problem, whereas in the second we 
arrive at an extralinguistic aspect of the same problem, i.e. 
we have come across a deictic element. And this is just what 
the capture of the real author of a crime can amount to. But 
this means that (1) does not contain any successful reference 
- at least not with respect to the individual that is existen-
tially generalized in (3x) - for it lacks the final deictic 
element that should pick out unambiguously the individual to be 
substituted into x. This also explains the validity of 
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existential generalization: it is context (2) that contains 
reference to the right individual, then the use of the 
quantifier in (2) is adequately grounded; but as we strongly 
hold that the three contexts should never be separated (they 
will have no relevance to the meaning of "secret" if used 
separately) the x bound by the same quantifier in (1) as in 
(2) serves only to show that there are persons (indicated by a) 
who cannot refer successfully to the individual to which 
others (indicated by b) can refer unambiguously; i.e. x is 
introduced to show the different epistemological relations 
of different persons to the same object. We see again that we 
are interested in the relations that hold between subjects 
(individuals) and objects (other individuals) where the subjects 
differ and the objects remain identical. This identity is shown 
once and for all by the same letter x and it is the context 
(2) that makes valid quantification in all the three, provided 
they are always occur together. Then, (d/x) does not indicate 
a reference to the individual d if (d-x) contains the sufficient 
condition of referring. What an analysis of secret should show 
is that this condition is often lacking, i.e. (1) is possible. 
But then we have to concede that the modal context of (1) might 
be referentially opaque; and not only this but that it might 
even allow the substitution of another individual than d, say d1 
because it is possible that p(d'/x) is true, even if p(d'=x) 
is false. But clearly p{d'/x) has no sense unless it is 
indicated who thinks the substitution of d' possible. This is 
for what (1) has been introduced; it not only shows the identity 
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of objects with which the different epistemological relations 
of the subjects hold but - as being referentially opaque at 
the same time - it may contain a reference though not to the 
right individual d but to another one, to d'. This mistaken 
reference (with respect to x fully specified in (2)) is based 
on certain predicates that occur in the given proposition p and 
apply uniquely to the right individual d to be substituted 
into x. This is a clear case of misdescription: a predicate P 
uniquely applying to an individual d is made to describe an 
individual d' by a given subject a. In spite of misdescription 
a will, be referring to d1 and not to d (to whom the predicate 
applies). What a does then is a kind of "de dicto" specifica-
tion of the referent in that he takes a predicate P and sees 
what individuals belong to its extension. But he may be wrong 
as he has been above choosing d' instead of d (with respect to 
the contexts). That means that (1) can be re—written as a "de 
dicto" reading: 
(4) a knows that (3x)p(x) 
while (2) will correspond to a relative "de re" reading:'''® 
(5) (:Jx) that a knows that p (x) . 
But as reference depends on reading a context "de re", what a 
does when he misdescribes d' as x (fully specified in (2)) is 
to make a conversion of "de dicto" into "de re". But the 
result of this process is reference to d' and not to d. So we 
can either prohibit such a conversion and say that only a "de 
dicto" reading is possible - in which case it can be strongly 
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doubted whether a is referring - or accept it as a possible 
conversion without the sufficient condition (d'=x) being 
fulfilled. But if so, then naturally the x. figuring in (1) and 
in (2) or in (4) and (5) will not be identical any longer 
(with respect to the contexts); and d will become a variable 
just like x. Once again the solution is pragmatical: it 
foreshadows the introduction of semantic strategies. 
3. The convertibility of "de dicto" in to "de re" 
We have seen that the modal contexts of (1) and (2) 
reflect the difference between a "de dicto" and a "de re" 
reading. The condition of reference is the possibility of "de 
re" reading while in describing the individuals all what we 
have is a set of predicates applicable to them, i.e. it suggests 
a "de dicto" gpecification; but then we always convert a "de 
dicto" reading into a corresponding "de re" one when we refer. 
So we should analyze some theses of the convertibility of "de 
dicto" into "de re" (or vice versa) stated by eminent philosop-
hers of our time. We have to deal with three different for-
mulations of the same problem. As we will argue later on, 
these different approaches - in spite of the diversity of the 
applied terms - describe the same phenomenon and so they run 
on parallel lines. In dealing with them we try to emphasize 
their most important characteristics focusing on the solution 
they give to the problem of the relation between the modalities 
"de dicto" and "de re". 
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But before treating these variations in detail we should 
mention that a criterion that makes the convertibility analytic 
is useless for us since it once for all excludes any kind of 
difference between (1) and (2) and thus the analysis of secret 
becomes impossible. Such a criterion is provided by what is 
known as the Barcan formula:*7 
(6) (x)L<f>x O L (x) <px 
the validity of which depends on the fact of whether there is 
a possible but unactual object in an arbitrary W w o r l d . Only 
when (6) ceases to be valid will it become relevant for us 
because it then allows the formulation of (1); however we are 
going to account for the possible but unactual object within 
a pragmatic framework. 
The first formulation of the problem is naturally linked 
with the name of Quine. According to him there are two diffe-
rent modal contexts: (i) transparent and (ii) opaque. Quantifica-
tion is only allowed in transparent contexts but then it will 
inevitably involve Aristotelean essentialism because to 
identify the variable x, which figures in the scope of a modal 
operator, with the x bound by, say an existential operator we 
need to select from all the possible features of a given 
individual to be substituted into x an essential feature that 
is known (believed, presumed etc.) by a, b, c figuring in the 
indices of the relative modal operator and this essential 
feature will serve as the basis of quantification into a modal 
context while quantification should be regardless of any kind 
of description of the individual. It is possible only if this 
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essential feature is among the features attributed in reality 
to the given individual. Then all the quantification is depen-
dent on a certain privileged description of a given object. 
From this argument it turns out that a purely transparent 
context is impossible for it will be true only "under a certain 
description" i.e. "necessity does not properly apply to the 
fulfilment of conditions by objects (such as the ball of rock 
which is Venus, or the number which numbers the planets), apart 
18 
from special ways of specifying them." So necessary fulfil-
ment of a given quantified proposition makes no sense as applied 
to physical objects x, but necessity attaches, at best, only to 
the connection between the given proposition and different means 
of specifying x. The conclusion is that modal contexts are a 
failure, at least transparently conceived, for they are opaque. 
But if this is just what opacity means then it is the same as 
modality "de dicto" applied to epistemic contexts. Still there 
are others who think that there is a crucial difference between 19 
the modality of necessity and propositional attitudes. The 
basis of their argument is that an arbitrary person may not know 
a given identity statement although identities are considered 
as cases of necessity. So propositional contexts lead to an 
infinite process of the splitting up of individuals. Still 
there efforts are being made to solve it within possible world 
semantics; the main difference, according to us, lies in 
choosing a relative point of view, be it our actual world, or 
a representative name, or the person himself whose proposi-
tional attitude is being described with the help of certain 
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possible worlds compatible with his set of beliefs (presump-
tions, knowledge etc.) - from which accessibility relations, 
substituion examples, etc. would be definable because, while 
necessity in many cases causes no problem, being valid for a 
whole class of entities (names, worlds) even in an absolute 
sense, with epistemic modalities we have to indicate certain 
sub-classes which can be given with respect to certain rela-
tive points of view. This latter is responsible for all accu-
sations of being committed to essentialism. This argument also 
shows why Kripke's semantics becomes exposed to such accusa-
tions only if being applied,'*0 but it is not dependent on a 
possible worlds semantics. The crucial problem in giving a 
semantics of propositional attitudes is that of referring. Just 
because of this do we consider the two kinds o.f modality 
("necessary" and epistemic) similar cases: they all turn on 
giving adequate criteria of reference. And this is what links 
the transparent-opaque distinction with that of "de dicto" -
"de re". Though we doubt that this problem could be solved 
within a semantic framework, we re-view some important approaches 
to try to account for the above distinction semantically, while 
at the end we give our reasons why this kind of analysis is 
doomed to fail. 
One of the most complete and thorough treatments of this 
21 
problem is given by Alvin Plantinga. His approach aims at 
giving the conditions of the convertibility of "de re" into 
"de dicto". He says: "Where x is an object and P is a property, 
the kernel proposition with respect to x and P (K) x, P( ) is 
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the proposition expressed by the result of replacing 'a:' and 
'p' in 'x has the complement of p' by the proper names of a: 
and P." And later he adds: "x has P essentially if and only 
22 
if x has P and K{x,P) is necessarily false." If essential 
properties are possessed necessarily, then the above require-
ment to explain modalities "de re" by modalities "de dicto" 
follows from the Quinean thesis that "necessity resides in 
the way we talk about things, not in the things we talk 
23 
about." Though this cannot be applied directly to proposi-
tional attitudes just because the modality of "necessary" 
involves "true in all possible worlds" and an epistemic one 
involves only "true in a possible world" (or worlds) compatible 
with the set of beliefs (presumptions, knowledge, etc.) of the 
person whose propositional attitude is being described". But 
as we have been interested in the relations that hold between 
subjects and objects (an epistemic analogue for modality of 
"necessary" could be an omnipotent subject) and in accordance 
with what we have said above on the privileged point of view 
in giving a semantics, these conditions of convertibility have 
to be applicable to epistemic cases, too. What matters here is 
that Plantinga's solution also fails in avoiding essentialism 
which is present in the requirement of certain favoured 
descriptions regardless of their being attributed to the object 
necessarily or of their being believed (presumed, known, etc.) 
to be attributed to it by a certain person. The convertibility 
of (7) in to (8) then turns on 'x is not a spy' which is being 
believed to be false by Ralph: 
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(7) (3x) (Ralph believes that x is a spy) 
(8) Ralph believes that Ox) (x is a spy). 
What seems to us a little disconcerting is what we may call 
an asymmetry of objects and properties; this means briefly 
that there can be certain properties.in a given world which 
are not instantiated by objects existing in that world 
although they do exist in it, while there are certain objects 
which, although they do not exist in a given world, do enjoy 
certain properties in it. Though this would not mean asymmetry 
with respect to all possible worlds, in Plantinga's work there 
is an implicit assessment: the properties not instantiated by 
objects existing in a given world need not correspond to those 
properties instantiated by objects not existing in that same 
world. This treatment runs the risk of considering properties 
to be objects and of so allowing that two kinds of objects 
exist side by side. This asymmetry may be due to the introdu-
cing of negation into the criterion of convertibility. For, 
given the two kinds of negation, then the complement of "being-
believed-by-Ralph-to-be-a-spy-in-V" - which is a world-indexed 
property and hence an essence - cannot be "being-believed-by-
Ralph-not-to-be-a-spy-in-f»'" because "the complement of P does 
not require that the object which it enjoys should exist in W; 
it is enjoyed by any object that either does not exist in W 
24 
or is non-P therein." 
The complement of a property P then is defined as a negation 
"de dicto" and this is exactly what the criterion of conver-
tibility prescribes. But then we are committed either to 
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properties not instantiated by objects existing in U or to 
objects not existing in W but enjoying certain properties. 
The problem of epistemic and "necessary" modalities and of 
their "de re" - "de dicto" convertibility is merely transferred 
into the problem of negations "de re" and "de dicto". Hence a 
semantic account of this problem seems either to be self-
defeating or to require some, by no means unambiguous, postula-
tion of the "de re" - "de dicto" convertibility. If. we cannot 
give a valid argument, then at least we can postulate either 
that each instance is "de dicto" and some are "de re" or that 
25 all instances are "de re" and some are "de dicto". And even 
in Plantinga's works there is a very serious postulation; namely 
that he assumes the fact to be accepted that everything can be 
2 6 
baptized which is clearly a pragmatic assumption and taken 
as a semantic one. This has, for us, a rather unfortunate result 
in that every descriptive phrase is at once a referring one, 
too. But if so, then there is not the slightest need for a 
criterion of convertibility because, even if not overtly, it 
is already implied in one of the semantic postulations. But then 
within such a system the concept of "secret" will never be 
explicable. In order to see clearly that to make a relative 
semantic system consistent one has to postulate an absolute 
convertibility of "de-re" - "de dicto" or at least the possi-
bility of it with respect to a favoured point of reference we 
may have other examples. 
27 
Rolf A. Eberle aims at giving an account of all kinds of 
false beliefs and even ignorances; to explain the invalidity 
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of identities within epistemic contexts he introduces the 
notion of "representative name" which is "special in the ob-
jective sense"; but this is not enough because this class of 
names has to fall back on "subjectively representative ones" 
(which are representative for a given person). As the first 
kind of name implies that the object referred to exists and 
as the second kind involves knowing.the object under some 
description or name, we have a clear criterion of convertibi-
lity of "de re" and "de dicto" within a semantic system, even 
if restricted to a class'of "representative names": "If one 
knows T under some name or description, then one knows that T 
exists" (i.e. the corresponding term is a referring one); 
formally, At •* K(T=T), where A stands for "knowing under some 
description". This shows that the identity of "representative 
names" is informative in that it corresponds to stating the 
existence of the object referred to. 
Semantically, then,' the difference of "de re" and "de dicto" 
is annulled. If I know x by some description, then x should 
exist, i.e. it should have a representative name in the 
objective sense, and if I know that x exists, then I should 
know x under some dexcription, i.e. it should have a repre-
sentative name in the subjective sense. 
2 8 
Thomas Baldwin finds the modality of "necessary" unproblematic 
as interpreted transparently; he constructs a semantic system 
TL which has as an axiom: "Neo p" is true in L iff NecCp" is 
true in L) . But this introduces "Nec" into the meta-language 
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and imposes a too strong criterion on semantics ("these sen-
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tences have these meanings" ): all identities turn out to be 
necessary. Another approach could be to treat "Nec" as a 
property of propositions (and then we write NEC). This should 
mean: "Nec p" is true in L iff NEC(ref("that p" ,L)) , where L 
is a given language and ref ("that p",L) = that n; latin letters 
being variables of the object language and Greek ones variables 
of the meta-language. But even in this latter case identities 
again turn out to be necessary and we have the following formula 
as an axiom: Ref ("that p" ,1) = that n NEC(that refC'that p",/,) = 
= that u) . The reason is that "Talk of propositions, therefore, 
is sheer nonsense unless it is taken for granted that, for the 
things of which propositions are functions, all identities are 
necessary". Formally: 
(9) a = 0 (that = that 4>B) 
(10) a = B (that NEC (that <|ia) = NEC (that 0B)) 
(11) a = B NEC(that o = 6).30 
So both arguments render useless a difference between "de re" 
and "de dicto"; even a linguistic conception of the modality of 
"necessary" canno£ do without the "de re" assumption: 
(x) (x=a -> Nec (x=a) ) . So a "de dicto" statement is always 
dependent on a "de re" assumption with respect to those en-
tities the "de dicto" statement is about.. But this criterion 
is clearly inapplicable to epistemic contexts because "the 
semantic theory must be regarded as giving a priori analytic 
truths about part of the structure of language."3''' And then, 
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it will only account for epistemic contexts if the relevant 
speakers were expected to have a thorough knowledge of all 
the inferences of what they know. And this may be our conclu-
sion, too; a semantic system should either psotulate a conver-
tibility thesis or do without it completely and consider epis-
temic contexts opaque. But while we accept his conclusion about 
semantic systems, we cannot accept that every epistemic context 
is, therefore, a priori opaque. (Contexts of "necessary" have 
been thought of as opaque, too, but they relied on correspon-
ding transparent explanations.) 
The claim of considering epistemic contexts "de re" i.e. 
transparent was put forward by Tyler Surge in his paper "3elief 
32 
DE RE". His basic argument is that there are cases when a 
belief "de re" cannot be converted into a corresponding belief 
"de dicto". He is for a shift of perspective on "de re" attitu-
des. Though this shift is due to a philosophical assumption on 
his part that perceptual contact should be favoured against a 
conceptual description, though "perceptual contact is, of 
course, not present in every "de re" belief." But clearly, 
there are cases when "there will often be no term or individual 
concept in the believer's set of beliefs about the relevant 
object which denotes that object."33 "De re" beliefs have, 
then, a contextual, non-conceptual aspect, and they are 
necessary to individuate the object. So to vindicate the 
priority of the modality "de re" we can conclude "that 'de re' 
belief sentences are not definable in terms of 'de dicto' 
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sentences" and it is "equally potent against the view that 
for every 'de re' belief there is an accompanying 'de dicto' 
belief that fully individuates the object the 'de re' belief 
34 
is about." Now, we arrived at a clear explication of the 
failure of the convertibility thesis and, moreover, it is put 
forward not withinaa semantics - which, as we have seen, would' 
be paradoxical - but within, if not a pragmatics, at least an 
extra-linguistic framework. This means that not only the 
referential-attributive distinction but that of "de re" -
"de dicto" is a pragmatic one. Otherwise we could not help 
thinking that all instances of "de re" would be convertible 
into "de dicto", which is clearly false. 
To conclude our review of the semantic treatments of the 
convertibility thesis we would like to mention some interesting 
cases when the convertibility is by no means possible (at least 
not semantically); 
a./ as it is known, one of the criteria of reading a context 
"de re" is substitution of identical, terms; but there are some 
constructions that resist substitution and still they are to F- ^ 
be read "de re"; e.g. in "Alfred believes that the man in the 
corner is a spy" the description "the man in the corner" can 
be thought of as both specifying the referent (and so suggest-
ing a "de re" reading) and characterizing the believer's 
conception of him (and so being a "de dicto" belief), while 
substitution fails with respect to the believer's set of 
beliefs about the denoted person.35 
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b./ proper names are said to induce "de re" modalities; but 
with some ordinary proper names and even with some vacuous 
ones we have purely "de dicto" belief attributions; more often, 
when used with a demonstrative that can even be implicit in 
the given name, it can be taken under some description suggesting 
a "de dicto" reading: e.g. in "A believes ̂ that Pegasus was a 
real horse", "Pegasus" is "that Pegasus" (whichever one we are 
36 
talking about)"; 
c./ a belief "de re" is said to pick out a unique individual; 
but from what we have said in connection with the first example 
(a.) it follows that a "de re" context may have different free 
variables as referents: i.e. "contextually difference uses of 
names (or demonstratives) which refer to a given entity may 
succeed ... in producing different belief contexts"; 
d./ within a semantic framework, we have seen, it is generally 
required that for every "de re" there should be a corresponding 
"de dicto"; but there are cases when there is no such "de 
dicto": e.g. "the present moment", "the ball in the sky" and 3 8 
other examples of time-space coordinates can show the idea; 
e./ "de re" is needed to give an account for cases when there 
is no uniquely specific way of referring or when there is 
misdescription of the referent or shifts of perspective, and 
this is one reason why rigid designation is considered neces-
sary; but this may not make manifest the difference between 
"de re" and "de dicto" for there can.be misdescription with 
definite description i.e. with "de dicto" Specification: e.g. 
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an Englishman may say that the next president of the House of 
Representatives of the United States Congress will be from a 
southern state; then if he said so before Sam Rayburn became 
the speaker of the House, the Englishman would not have been 
referring to Sam Rayburn, though he intended to refer to the 
speaker of the House even if there is no particular person to 
whom he was referring; so this should be a case of opaque 
reference (a "de dicto" specification) with misdescription, 
although there is not possible a corresponding "de re" reading: 
to refer opaquely the believer does not need to recognize that 
the description he uses uniquely denotes the x he intends to 
* 4- 39 refer to; 
f./ finally the strongest reason against any analytic converti-
bility thesis may be the following: even if a description is 
uniquely specifying it may not allow existential generaliza-
tion; but what if we have n uniquely defining descriptions 
specifying the same referent? - or how many uniquely defining 
descriptions do we need to justify a "de re" reading": e.g. 
the police know an almost infinite number of uniquely specifying 
predicates with respect to the Ripper of Hampshire and still a 
"de re" convertibility was not allowed. 
So much for counter-examples; we think they clearly explain 
why only a pragmatic account of convertibility seems possible. 
But then the "de re" - "de dicto" distinction amounts to the 
40 
same as the referential-attributive one. So if we are going 
to explain the "de re" - "de dicto" distinction - which has 
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long been considered as a semantic problem - pragmatically it 
may seem that we should exclude the "de dicto" reading from 
the cases of reference. But already at this point of our 
analysis we have to emphasize that it is the possibility of 
the conversion that is the source of reference..Even an 
attributive use may be referring but it then presupposes the 
possibility of "de re" reading and its success will be context-
dependent. That means that a modal context such as (1) may be 
referring, but not necessarily, to the x fully specified by the 
context of (2); (1) presupposes a multiplicity of possible 
conversions, which, in turn, depend on the intention of the 
speaker. 
It is David S. Schwarz who gives a pragmatic account of 
41 
the convertibility. In "Naming and Necessity" he argues for 
a shift of perspective with respect to some over-discussed 
semantic problems. In his analysis semantics becomes reduced 
to being conversationally implicated by a total communicative 
act. All semantic problems become at once pragmatic: "What 
the pragmatic treatment does do, however, is to remove these 
concerns from the proper domain of the semantics for language 
- instead treating them as problems in explicating the proposi-42 
tions speakers express." He uses two terms (also Quinean) : 
notional and relational specification. But they reflect the 
same difference as transparent vs opaque, or "de re" vs "de 
dicto"; 
(12) There is someone John thinks is a spy 
(13) (3x) (John believes x is a spy) 
(14) John thinks that George is a spy 
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(15) John thinks (3x) (x is a spy) . 
What Schwarz does later in his book is similar to Plantlnga's 
treatment: his intention is to define relational belief 
(belief "de re") (12) and (13) in terms of notional (belief "de 
dicto") (14) and (15) . But as he is going to give a pragmatic 
account of convertibility he can avoid introducing possible 
worlds and other semantic entities. A first attempt to explain 
relational in terms of notional can have the following result 
when formulated: 
(16) [(3P) (Tr(P,b) and John B rthe P i s f 1 ] ] + C 4 3 
where P is a property that is true (Tr) of an object b, i.e. 
it is uniquely specifying and John has the notional belief 
t1^...1), while C stands for a non-notional link between John 
and the object b (e.g. a direct perceptual contact). So for-
mulated as a weak theory of reference, Schwarz can do without 
the thesis that there is a causal relation between the object 
b and a given person, John (unless it is C that specifies). 
Though this does not exclude rigid reference but the conditions 
of rigidity will be pragmatically presupposed: rigid reference 
is needed just because there is no way always to specify the 
referent relationally. So, notional specification (and notional 
belief respectively) is in need of a relational one, and this 
is just what Bürge claimed. Then, the pragmatic theory of 
reference can be explicated within a Gricean framework: 
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(17) (3/5) (3P^) {Tr.{P1,r) and S uttered X M-intending 
(3P2) (Tr (Pg, the P^) and A to think r(3P)(3P3) 
(Tr(P3, the P2) and (i) Corr (S, X, the P ) 
and (ii) S thinks rthe P ; has F 1) ) or C,1 or C^ ) 
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or C 
where A is an audience, Pj ... P and F are predicates, r is 
the referent of which the given predicates are true (Tr), 
Corr(S, X, the P^) expresses a correlation between the speaker 
(S) and the utterance (X) and a given predicate (P.), and 
«-intention is short for: (i) S intends by X to produce a 
response r in A, (ii) S intends A to recognize (i), (iii) S 
intends /i's fulfilment of (ii) to be part of 4's reason for 
fulfilling (i). This account is valid even for cases when the 
terms (uniquely applying predicates) in which the speaker and 
the audience think of a given object do not overlap and though 
there is a successful reference. The descriptions with respect 
to the speaker and to the audience need not be the same because 
referring is reduced to the speaker's intention and to its 
recognition by the audience. Vihat is important relative to our 
argument is that - in most.cases - the speaker is expected to 
specify his object relationally during the conversation, but 
generally he (and the audience, too) thinks of it in a notional 
way. This shows the difference in a logical analysis of epis-
temological attitudes and communication. As our prior aim is 
' 1 
to account for a communicative act, i.e. a pragmatic definition 
of "secret", we are - with Schwarz - in favour of a relational 
0 
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treatment of belief, and because of not having special detectors » 
to examine the speaker's or the audience's mind we account for 
notional specification as a kind of conversational implicature. 
4. Secret and the convertibility thesis 
What are the consequences of such a pragmatic approach to 
the usual semantic problems? How are they related to our argu-
ment? In the following way: the convertibility of relational 
into a corresponding notional specification is by no means 
always possible. We as speakers cannot make manifest every 
time all our notional terms and so we cannot but fall back on 
specifying the referent relationally. 
This is also a valid counter-argument to the thesis of proper 
names as disguised descriptions. Though naturally we cannot 
do completely without them, in spite of escaping their abundan-
ce in ordinary conversation with specifying relationally. In 
the case of secret it is these uniquely applying predicates 
that are highly relevant. What is then the criterion of con-
vertibility? - simply a Richness Condition of many uniquely 
defining descriptions pragmatically presupposed. If this con-
dition is not fulfilled, then the utterance containing a 
corresponding relational specification will be - according to 
Schwarz - unhappy. This unhappiness should be due to the 
speaker's uncooperativeness, or irony, or not being sincere, 
etc. One possible way to define convertibility more precisely 
is to say that there should be at least two loci in a given 
dossier D of uniquely applying predicates relative to a given 
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object, and these two loci are believed (presumed, known, etc.) 
by the speaker and the audience respectively. Furthermore, they 
should not be trivially instantiated, i.e. they should neither 
logically nor epistemológically imply one another; e.g. to go 
on to specify relationally the murderer of the president you 
have to have at least two clear pieces of evidence (1) his 
having been seen by someone at the time of the murder and (ii) 
the recognition that the gun, which killed the president, is 
his. Then, if you know that he is the person d (i.e. the two 
predicates are uniquely true of him), you can make a valid 
conversion of p(d/x) into p (d=x). From this it results clearly 
that in the case of secret it is just the prohibition of this 
conversion which is relevant. The prohibition of converting a 
notional belief into a corresponding relational one, i.e. (18) 
into (19) and (20) into (21): 
(18) John thinks that the tallest man in Dallas is a 
murderer 
(19) John thinks Oswald is a murderer (which is the 
some as "John thinks of Oswald that is a murderer) 
(20) John thinks (3a;) (x is a murderer) 
(21) (3x) John thinks (x is a murderer). 
If in an ordinary conversation it is the speaker's coopera-
tlveness that makes a relative utterance happy, in the case 
of secret we mean just that the speaker is intentionally 
uncooperative. This realizes a conversation in which certain 
pragmatic presuppositions are unfulfilled. This uneasiness. 
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which is felt when the speaker and the audience specify their 
object relationally in spite of thinking of it notionally, Is 
conveyed by a condition that Schwarz and others impose on or-
dinary conversation and we think that it is residual of a 
semantic claim about these pairs of notions we have been 
examining for so long - a condition saying that every notional 
specification is at once relational, too. Though it certainly 
44 
need not be rigid. We hold that this condition is very 
reasonable as far as ordinary conversation is concerned; it 
was just the basic criterion why a semantic account could 
have been given. But there is a relative difference between 
a semantic and a pragmatic formulation of the same problem: 
while in semantics such an assumption appears to be a norma-
tive ideal and obscures the point why, on what criteria, a 
conversion is possible, not considering that these criteria 
might change from case to case, in pragmatics such a condition 
reflects an intention of the audience (or the speaker) to go 
on to specify relationally in spite of not having adequate 
evidence, in spite of not knowing whether the corresponding 
descriptions are uniquely defining and even if some of Quine's 
theses are then violated. To see clearly the interdependence of 
notional and relational specification we allude to Castañeda's 
similar wording of the same idea: "the only uniquely defining 
descriptions believed by the speaker to be had by the subject 
of the proposition is not made known" and so "shared beliefs may 45 not correspond with respect to (an object) 0". But this time 
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the conclusion is different: the lack of notional specification 
makes a proposition opaque for we do not know in what terms a 
thinks óf B even if the proposition is referentially transpa-
rent. This new sense of "opaque" i.e. "propositionally opaque" 
comes to mean just the lack of any "de dicto" reading; while 
Burge, Schwarz and others prefer a relational specification, 
a "de re" reading to a corresponding notional "de dicto" one. 
Castañeda is in favour of the latter so that it makes possible 
a relative clarification of the terms we think of concerning 
the same individuals. For this reason he is concerned with indi-
rect speech, i.e. with reported propositional attitudes, the 
iteration of epistemic contexts. But this does not make any 
difference with respect to the speaker and the audience because 
the logical relations, the lack of overlapping predicates, the 
need for relational specification, etc. - that hold between 
them are the sames as those that hold between the reporter and 
the person whose propositional attitude is being reported. So 
what we have here is that again convertibility appears to be 
imposed on ordinary communication and reflects the interrela-
tedness of a conceptual and a non-conceptual approach to the 
universe. And we may choose which to prefer between the two 
ways with the philosophical background that motivates our 
choice. We do not want to judge once and for all the age-old 
battle of nominalists and realists; according to us the real 
problem is that we cannot describe what a relational ("de re") 
specification is for as soon as we are doing this we inevitably 
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fall back on a notional ("de dicto") definition of the object; 
just for this reason a relational specification can never be 
made manifest but only presupposed. It is the possibility of 
a conversion that matters: the possibility that we are speaking 
of the right individuals. In this framework "secret" refers to 
the interrelatedness of these two ways of specification, to 
the finding of the right individuals figuring in our universe 
46 
of discourse in our actual world but at the same time it 
alludes to the in-adequetaness of the search. 
In connection with the idea that every notional specifi-
cation is also relational, we have to deal with another argu-
ment which seems to contradict our original thesis about the 
three modal contexts to be defined as the conditions of "sec-
ret" and which seems to be even counter-intuitive to the con-
vertibility thesis, too. It runs as follows: though a concep-
tual framing of the universe is very important and has a 
crucial role in conversation, every such notional specifica-
tion can be embedded in a non-notional one (in other words it 
can be indexical). This is the idea of a symmetrical universe. 
But it says no more than there is in Bürge's paper about the 
priority of a "de re" attitude which is strongly based on 
perceptual contact. Then if non-notional specification is 
irreducible to a notional one, it might seem that the diffe-
rence between our contexts of (1) and (2) evaporates, for in 
cases of certain objects, ways of doing something, moments of 
time or place such as a hidden sword, a method of making gold, 
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the.time of meeting in a cave, etc. considered as secret, a 
notional and a corresponding relational specification cannot j. 
be distinguished (i.e. a direct perceptual contact is strongly 
needed). This is reflected in the relative grammatical con-
struction: to express such an idea in many languages a dif-
ferent verb is used, while in English it is the construction 
"know + direct Object" that shows the difference in meaning.47 
This is the case that Russell preferred for his logically 
proper names. But "we need not know the individuals when jud-
ging them: it need not be about a particular person" and "even 
if judging them we may do it on basis of (descriptive) 'knowing 
4 8 
who/what' not only of 'knowing him' (demonstrative)" ; i.e. we 
may know what the hidden sword is like, or we may know (guess) 
many things about making gold even without knowing that the 
prescriptions we know allude to a possible way of making it, 
or we may know that the meeting is on Saturday but we may not 
know-at what hour precisely, or we may know that the cave is in 
that forest but not know which path leads to it, etc. So there 
can always be certain parts of the given object, which are 
thought of as "not known", i.e. as "secret", that can be 
adequately or not, conceptualized, i.e. associated with uniquely 
applying predicates (even if they may contain a deictic 
element). So our original difference between the epistemic 
contexts of (1) and (2) can be preserved. This concludes our 
argument about the validity of conditions of convertibility. 
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5. Secret as a system of rules of communication 
When defining the epistemological conditions we have seen 
that the secret can never be equated with a given state of 
affairs or with propositions referring to them (i.e. with 
(3a;) (x killed the president)) but only with their embedding 
in a modal context (i.e. (3x) ~ (x killed the president)); 
this means that the secret cannot be considered as an entity 
but rather as a system of conditions and rules that govern 
the human activity of knowing and communicatingvThis governing 
mechanism will now be analyzed. 
The interrelatedness of conditions and rules means that 
every definable set of conditions determines certain applicable 
rules and conversely, every set of rules pragmatically presup-
poses certain conditions. With our three modal contexts we have 
given a semantic framework theory as a normative ideal. But as 
we have argued, it is strongly dependent on the total communi-
cative act which turns on the possibility of a pragmatic 
definition of convertibility. So it is this pragmatic possibi-
lity, and sometimes constraint, that makes our semantic system, 
valid and especially the existential generalization in the 
contexts (naturally the use of "to know" adds to this possibi-
lity) . If now, we substitute our variables a, b and o with 
their corresponding class-terms A, B and C, two different 
schemes of communicaton can be described: 
(22) ADDRESSER = A or Bj MESSAGE = (3x)p(d/x); ADDRESSEE = C 
(23) ADDRESSER = B; MESSAGE = (3x)p(d=x); ADDRESSEE = A or C. 
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The first scheme gives a rule which strengthens the function 
of secret within a community because it increases the number 
of those who know about the secret but who do not know the 
solution to it. This rule converts the elements of C into B. 
The second scheme gives a rule which annihilates the function 
of secret because it increases the number of those who also 
know the solution to it. So this rule converts the elements 
of A or C into B. More specific rules can be obtained by 
restricting in diverse ways the numbers of the classes, A, B 
and C. If A = o , B = 1, C = n, we have a borderline case: 
secrets of-diaries, private affairs, which are known only by 
those whom it concerns. Many say that we'can speak about 
secret if and only if B = 2, while according to others it is 
just the rule that prescribes that B should contain two 
elements what destroys any possible concept of "secret" because 
it violates the basic requirement of "secret": i.e. "Do not 
tell it to anyone!" But this approach neglects class A which, 
in fact, turns out to be the most important with respect to 
the function of secret; so the minimal necessary rule (or set 
of rules) should be the following: A = 1, B = 7-, C = n, or 
perhaps the weaker: A=l,B=o,C=n. What for us is the 
most important is that A = o and C = o cannot be conceded at 
the same time. Naturally the relative position of A, B and C 
may change from moment to moment: with the starting of commu-
nication individuals may shift from one class into another. 
This process may strengthen with the going-on of time, thus 
making it possible to define different sequences of triads of 
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contexts. This means that the contexts are time-related but 
only with respect to the individuals they contain in their 
scope, i.e. with respect to diverse types of instantiation, 
while their logical structure remains the same. 
Now we can try to incorporate the pragmatic feature of 
convertibility into our system of rules; then the first scheme 
would need some reformulation on the basis of the weak theory 
of referring explicated by Schwarz; we can say something like 
this: 
(24) OA) (3Pj) (Tr(P1,d) and S uttered x M-intending 
r (3P2) {Tr (F2, the P^) and A to think r(3F)(3P3) 
(Tr(P3, the Pg) and (i) Corr {S, X, the P3) and 
(ii) S does not think rthe P has f"1 ) ) or C J* or 
6 «5 
C * ) or C2. 
This means that the relevant information (P^) is withheld but 
not because it is conversationally implicated - as it is the 
case with the Richness Condition - for it is the speaker's 
intention to make A believe that he (the speaker) does not 
himself possess the relevent information; e.g. if "d is the P 
and ff rthe P. is a murderer"1" then it should entail "Nec ii is i 
[a: is a murderer]", where "N vs Nec" is a transcript for "notional 
vs relational necessity", but the speaker withholds P^ that 
should be needed for specifying d relationally (and generalizing 
4 9 
it existentially). The presence of "necessary" naturally 
does not influence the validity of our argument: it just 
indicates that there is a possible way of explaining necessity 
pragmatically as the inevitability of conversion. 
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The consequence of all this is that during a type of 
communication described in (22) and (24) two intentions 
collide: while the speaker, in contrast to the ordinary commu-
nicative situation, does not intend A to specify the referent 
relationally due to lack of the necessary information, the 
audience, wanting to fulfill the requirement imposed on ordinary 
communication with respect to A himself, intends to go on to 
specify the referent relationally and expects S to intend A 
himself to do so and expect S further to communicate the 
necessary information needed for a valid conversion. The 
collision of the two intentions is then due to the uncoopera-
tiveness of the speaker. While the speaker has changed his 
attitude with respect to the ordinary communicative situa-
tion, the audience does not recognize this; but then the 
opposite is also possible: the speaker remains faithful to the 
ordinary requirements of communication, but the audience does 
not do accordingly; he changes his attitude, now, and presuppo-
ses that S has violated another maxim of Grice, namely the maxim 
of Quality: A thinks that the necessary information, the uniquely 
applying predicate P. has been in fact communicated by S but it/he it 
does not define uniquely the referend d. Again two intentions 
collide but just in the opposite way as they do in the previous 
case. Then, there is the natural situation, when the two inten-
tions correspond; this is called ordinary communication; and 
there is the unnatural situation when the two intentions cannot 
collide because both the speaker and-the audience have changed 
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their attitudes; this is the case of communication without 
mutual understanding so that it can hardly be called commu-
nication anymore, at least with respect to the referents of 
what the communication should be about. The pragmatics of 
"secret" then describe a situation that is mid-way between a 
normal communication and an abnormal one. The other scheme (23) 
then corresponds to a normal communicative situation and can 
be reformulated as the weak theory of reference. 
Concluding our whole argument, we can sum it up in that 
secret turns always on some kind of identity being known or not 
Identity statements have long been considered necessary, the 
fact of which, in turn, destroyed all attempts to formulate an 
epistemic logic just because there could easily be found cases 
when the speakers failed to have such ideal knowledge. We have 
seen that this failure is due to there being some pragmatic 
prohibition of convertibility of "de dicto" into "de re" or 
notional into relational. This is what the explication of the 
concept of "secret" can amount to: But then there may not be 
any logical failure in many semantic systems because the problem 
just lies elsewhere. It is in the interrelatedness of our concep 
tual and referential universe.50 And from this secret can also 
gain its force. 
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6. Secret and literature 
In this section we would like to use these ideas in an 
analysis of narrative texts. The starting point could be the 
time relatedness of modal contexts (1), (2) and (3). Then one 
can define on every narrative text a sequence of triads of 
contexts with respect to the characters that figure in the 
text. These triads should correspond to states of affairs and 
each triad could be described with the relative configuration 
of A, B and C. One basic difficulty would be the selection of 
a crucial proposition to be embedded in the modal contexts. It 
seems that any selection would be ambiguous because it would 
involve a kind of interpretation as the chosen proposition is 
to be superimposed on the whole semantic structure of the text. 
At present this is really inevitableSurely there could be 
defined other indicators to make valid our selection. But at 
this present time we do not wish to go into this problem. Let 
it suffice that now.the definition of the triads of contexts is 
in principle possible. Then there is another aspect that may 
turn out more relevant; the abstract semantic description of 
the contexts - as we have stated - depends on some converti-
bility thesis but that can be given only within a pragmatic 
framework. This amounts to the description of the total 
communicative act. But soon we will see that it is not enough; 
the convertibility thesis is not important only for an abstract 
semantics but is perhaps more important for a corresponding 
logic of actions that defines certain states in the same given 
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text. What the convertibility thesis can do is to relate to 
each other the two kinds of sequence of states, that of modal 
contexts and that of actions. This correlation is based on 
strategies; to describe it we have to introduce game-theore-
tical elements into our analysis, though they have long been 
implied by our approach, which is similar to Hintikka's model 
set constructions. Now, the only thing we have to do is to give 
a game-theoretical definition of quantifiers: it is Hintikka's 
rule (G.E) which runs as follows: "If G is of the form (3x)Go, 
I choose a member of D, give it a name, say '«' (if it did 
not have one before). The game is continued with respect to 
G o(nA)." 5 1 
Where D is a domain of individuals, G is a substitution-
instance of a subformula of F. This is called "instantiation". 
Naturally nothing guarantees that our choice was correct. We 
may not have chosen the proper individual and then we may lose. 
So this rule can be correlated with our contexts (1), namely 
the situation when different persons, say a, guess who the 
murderer could have been without having adequate evidence. If 
our instantiation is correct and we win, then we can be corre-
lated with the context of (2). This can be the game-theoretical 
interpretation of (3x)p(d/x) and (3x)p(d=x) on an abstract 
semantic level. At the beginning of the game our chosen in-
dividual n need not be d, i.e. we may be wrong, just because 
the relevant information is withheld; we have to take a risk; 
but though we might violate the convertibility thesis - and 
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this is what often happens in the cases of secrets - our 
strategy, by which we have chosen the individual n, will 
determine our strategy, by which we perform an action; i.e. if 
we are reasonable beings - and this is really a restriction on 
our analysis - our logic of action depends on how we instantiate 
into given variables of propositons. Then it means that the 
strategy of action will be a function of the strategy of 
instantiation. Naturally the chosen individual need not be a 
particular individual. Still if it is one, it need not be the 
right one with respect to the given contexts; but then there 
seems to be no need for possible worlds to explain reference 
to non-actual individuals, for it is the multiplicity of 
strategies that can explain awáy the cases of referring to 
individuals which do not exist, presupposing that the conver-
tibility thesis has been violated. This completes our tentative 
account of cases when possible but non-actual objects are being 
referred to within a pragmatic framework; the failure of the 
Barcan formula is not due to a semantic paradox (that there 
exists a possible but non-actual object) but rather to having 
chosen a wrong strategy of instantiation though it is the 
end-point of the search, the actual finding of the individual 
that decides whether we are wrong. But let us look at an 
example. It is taken from a well-known criminal story but we 
think that.this does not imply any restriction on the applica-
bility of the theory. So, we are in the last but one scene of 
"Ten Little Niggers"; there are only two still living, a man 
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and a woman. 
The logic of action prescribes that the man should shoot the 
woman and then commit suicide. And he does so accordingly. 
But in the film based on the book he does not shoot. What are 
the differences and how can we account for his actions? The 
problem can be formulated as follows: in the above described 
part of the sequence of triads" of contexts we have to consider 
two individuals; the selection of the corresponding proposi-
tion seems to be manifest: it is (3a;) (x killed eight persons) , 
i.e. (ax)p(x). If the relative section of the sequence is i, 
then in the i-l-th section both individuals (let them be a^ and 
a2 respectively) belonged to class A. In the i-th section the 
man (a^) has moved into class B because he thinks of her as a 
murderer (a2) . Therefore, he shoots. Then if his strategy, with 
which he makes the instantiation of x as a^, is then his 
strategy, with which he acts is a function of 5, i.e. <f> (£) . 
Then at the end of the book, in the i+l-th section of the 
sequence, a^ changes his strategy and makes another instan-
tiation of x as i.e. he. thinks himself to be the murderer 
(here we can see how "illogical" someone's conversion into 
relational specification can be). Then, if his new strategy 
is n, his other strategy, according to which he should commit 
suicide, will be a function of it: <f> (n) - However in the film 
another thing happens: he does not shoot the woman; but just 
because his strategy of instantiation of x as a w i l l be 
substituted by another one, say a strategy according to 
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which x should be instantiated as an whoever particular person 
a n be: then, his strategy not to shoot the woman will be 4>(C). 
This means that they both remain in class A in the ¿-th section 
of the sequence. There is neither a correct nor an incorrect 
identity of individuals to be presumed. The corresponding game 
is not played to the end. This short example conveys our idea 
about the role of secret in narrative texts. As a conclusion 
we try to give the complete modal contextual analysis of a 
text, which this time will be a play, namely Racine's Phedre. 
Our approach is the same as that described above, though 
naturally the situation is more complicated with more indivi-
duals involved and even with different kinds of secret to be 
defined.. We consider the play well-known and are not going to 
re-tell its story. We restrict ourselves only to indicating 
the relevent modal triads and the strategies. A single triad 
will be called the i-th section of the sequence. If Theseus = 
= a, Phaedra = b, Hippolytus = e> Aricia = d, Oinone - e, 
Theramenes = f, Ismene = g, the secret can be defined as the 
following sentence: Phaedra loves Hippolytus and Hippolytus 
loves Aricia and Aricia loves Hippolytus; the last conjunct 
could be ommited because it will not change the course of 
analysis which, though, would in turn be too complicated (we 
do not want to deny that it may be as important as the others 
in the whole structure of the play). Another reason for this 
can be that within the play the relation of a and d as 
instantiated in "y loves z" is symmetrical. The formulation 
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of the above sentence can be something like this: (3a;) (3y) (3a) 
• (x loves y and y loves z and z loves y) , i.e. (3x) (3y) (3z)p(x, 
y, a), while its embedding in a modal context would result in: 
(3rc) (3x) (3y) (32) (Knp(b/x, o/y, d/z), though there are other 
ways to construct it depending on the person's (n) proposi-
tional attitude. Then we postulate that to belong to class b 
the given individual n should make all instantiations correctly, 
otherwise he will belong to class A or C. Then the three modal 
context are the following: 
(25) (3i)(3x) Oy)(3s)[K^p (b/x, o/y, d/z) and ~ K^plb^x, 
o=y, d=z)] 
(26) (3j) Ox) (By) (3b) [X .p (b/x, o/y, d/z) and K.p(b=x, 
J 0 
o-y , d=z)] 
(27) (3h) (3x) (3y) (3z) ~ Khp(b/x, o/y, d/z). 
An arbitrary section will be S^, while the whole sequence is 
SE. It the first section is S ̂ , then our analysis will begin 
always with S^-l section. The relative configuration of each 
section will be indicated first, and then the differenc stra-
tegies which are chosen by the individuals i, 3 and h. Then a 
rough scheme of SE of Racine's play can be given as follows: 
5-7 A = b, o 
B - o 
C = a, d, e, f, n 
Then, b and o COMMUNICATE their instantiatioir-propositipn to 
their confidantes, and so there results 
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A = b, a, e, f 
B = a 
C = a, d, g 
Then, b COMMUNICATES to a and then, c COMMUNICATES to d their 
instantiation-propositions, and so there results 
52 A = b, e, f, (g) 
B = Cy d 
C = a 
Then, b COMMUNICATES to a the instantiation-proposition 
suggested to her by e, so there results 
53 A - a, b, e, f, 
B = a, d 
C = o 
Then, if a's strategy to instantiate is 5, <fi(C) is to send 
his son away (who dies); if o's strategy to instantiate is £, 
<f> (C) is to obey his father; if d's strategy to instantiate is 
(the same as c*s, they know the same), $(£) is also the same: 
to go into exile; plus: e COMMUNICATES to b her instantiation-
proposition (suggested by a through a, i.e. there is a chain 
of communication), and so there results 
54 A = a, f, (g) 
B - b, a, d, e 
C - o 
Then, if the strategy of b to instantiate is 5, the i|i(£) is 
to commit suicide; but first she COMMUNICATES to a her 
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instantiation-proposition and so there results. 
S6 A = if), (g) 
B = a, (b), (a), (e) 
C = o. 
Naturally this is not the complete analysis of the strategies; 
we indicated those which are in close connection with the 
semantic strategies of instantiation. There are certain simplifi-
cations in the scheme for we have not defined all modal contexts 
with respect to all the possible different configurations of 
the elements of A , B and C; it could have been done on the 
basis of atomic propositions, i.e. if we had treated every 
single communicative act of every individual as a rule for new 
triad-construction; but this might have caused useless 
complications. The individuals in brackets are either dead in 
the section they figure ox it is difficult to define their 
epistemic contexts at that point of the sequence for there is 
no reference about them in the text. Though there are strategies 
that are the same as they are dependent on the same ways of 
instantiation, there is no reason a priori that the same 
strategy of instantiation determines the same strategy of 
action for there may be other determinents to be considered. 
Now, we only wanted to show one-to-one correlations of stra-
tegies. From the above scheme it is clear that there is no 
essential difference between a strategy (and an act, respecti-
vely) of communicating a proposition and a strategy (and an 
act) in the strict sense of the word. In the play, though, 
there is a turning point when the communicative acts switch 
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over into a series of "real" acts. But their logic remains 
the same, and this much can be the final conclusion: that 
the logic of communication and the logic of action are too 
interwoven to be treated distinctly in that they both are 
functions of semantic strategies of instantiation. 
Notes 
1 Their interrelatedness and contrast will be the object' of 
our forthcoming analysis; the previous is conceptual, while 
the latter is pragmatic. ' 
2 
James A. H. Murray, Henry Bradley et alii (eds.): The Oxford 
English Dictionary, vol. IX., Clarendon Press, Oxford (1961) 
pp. 357-358. 
3 An item of information is minimal if it informs us about 
the existence of ah object, and it is maximal (or adequate) 
if it also accounts for the reasons of its existence. 
4 Cf. Searle (1969) pp. 4-12. 
5 To make a distinction between semantics and pragmatics, 
nowadays, seems to be very problematic; we do not want to 
delineate exactly their proper domain but to indicate some 
relations of semantic terms and their pragmatic applica-
bility. . 
6 In Strawson (1971). 
- 327 -
7 Hintikka (1973) p. 137. 
8 Cf. Merrill (1978). 
9 Cf. Walker (1975). 
1 0 Cf. McLane (1979). 
1 1 Merrill (1978) p. 321. 
12 
Although we do not want to deny one of the fundamental 
theorems of epistemic logic, namely that from "knowing 
that p" it follows that "p is true". 
1 3 Cf. Baldwin (1975). 
1 4 Hintikka (1973) p. 49. 
1 5 The concept of end-points of search parallels Rusell's 
concept of logically proper names, i.e. it presupposes 
the possibility of getting acquainted with the objects 
as the referents of the terms. 
^ A "de re" reading corresponds to an existential generali-
zation: cf. Hintikka-Carlson (1979). 
1 7 Cf. Hughes-Cresswell (1968) pp. 170-188. 
1 8 Linsky (1971) p. 27. 
1 9 Cf. Baldwin (1975). 
2 0 Cf. Plantinga (1974) pp. 248-251. 
2 1 Cf. Plantinga (1969) and (1974). 
2 2 Plantinga (1974). p. 30. 
2 3 Plantinga (1974) p. 26. 
- 328 -
2 4 Plantinga (1974) p. 63. 
25 
These are the views of Hintikka and Smullyan; cf. 
Plantinga (1974) pp. 231-233. 
2 6 Plantinga (1969) p. 253. 
2 7 Cf. Eberle (1974) . 
2 8 Cf. Baldwin (1975) pp. 84-87. 
2 9 Baldwin (1975) p. 84. 
3 0 Baldwin (1975) pp. 86-87. 
3 1 Baldwin (1975) p. 104. 
3 2 Cf. Bürge (1977). 
3 a Bürge (1977) p. 352. 
3 4 Bürge (1977) p. 353. 
3 5 Cf. Bürge (1977) p. 342. 
3 6 Cf. Bürge (1977) p. 343. 
3 7 Cf. Bürge (1977) p. 344. note 7. 
3 8 Cf. Bürge (1977) p. 352. 
3 9 Cf. Ray (1980) pp. 441-443. 
4 0 Cf. Ray (1980) p. 435. 
4 1 Cf. Schwarz (1979) . 
4 2 Schwarz (1979) p. 185. 
4 3 Schwarz (1979) p. 6. 
4 4 . Schwarz (1979) p. 48. 
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Castañeda (1977) p. 173. 
Cf. note 15. 
Some examples could be: French "savoir" vs "connaître", 
Italian "sapere" vs "conoscere", Hungarian "tud" vs 
"ismer". 
Cf. Hintikka (1974) Chapter XI. 
Cf. Schwarz (1979) p. 184. 
In other words, how far the end-point of the search can 
be foretold semantically. 
Cf. Hintikka (1973) p. 1Ô0. 
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